产业集群中的可信承诺及治理--基于核心企业与配套企业关系视角的研究
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浙江财经学院硕士学位论文
I
摘要
承诺问题一直以来都是政治经济学者讨论的范畴，以 Acemoglu 为代表的政治
经济学者认为，拥有政治权利的人无法做出可信的承诺约束其未来的行动。但随
着经济学科的相互交融，承诺问题似乎已经越来越渗入到产业集群领域内的核心
企业与配套企业之间。由于集群内企业行为人的有限理性和信息不完全，企业之
间往往难以达成完备的契约，于是承诺问题也就出现了。为了合作的顺利进行，
在正式契约之外，企业之间往往还存在许多隐性的默契的承诺；此外，集群发展
到现有情况下，企业之间的合作也经常表现为企业家之间非正式的契约或口头承
诺形式。然而，无论是这些隐性的默契的承诺，还是企业家之间基于“人情圈”
关系的承诺，其共同的特点是，无法被第三方证实，也不具备法律约束力。因此，
不得不令我们深思的是，这些承诺可信吗？集群内核心企业和配套企业在何种情
况下的承诺是值得可信的？与之相关的是，什么因素会对核心企业与配套企业承
诺可信产生影响及其影响机制又是如何？由此引出的是，又该如何来治理核心企
业与配套企业之间的承诺，使之变得更为可信，等等。探明这些问题，对于如何
提高产业集群中核心企业与配套企业间的合作及其稳定性具有重要的价值。
有鉴于此，本文①拟在现有文献研究不足的基础上，基于产业集群企业层面的
视角，从理论上构建了核心企业与配套企业之间可信承诺的博弈模型，并在此基
础上应用数理分析方法，借助一般化的正态分布概率形式将核心企业与配套企业
可信承诺进行量化，进而探讨核心企业与配套企业在何种情况下能够信守承诺，
进一步从理论上分析关系资本投入、交易费用的节省、长期合作预期得益等因素
对核心企业与配套企业承诺可信概率的影响机制，继而进一步运用数值模拟技术
对关系资本投入等因素对核心企业与配套企业承诺可信性概率的影响进行分析。
此外，本文尤其重视现实情况下关系资本因素对核心企业与配套企业承诺可信
性的影响，从理论上分析了关系资本投入如何维持核心企业与配套企业之间可信
的承诺，及其对核心企业与配套企业之间形成可信承诺的作用机制。
最后，在前述理论研究的基础上，系统地提出了一个可行的治理核心企业与配
套企业可信承诺的三维治理体系。
通过本文的研究，我们得到：
1. 当市场价格相对于核心企业与配套企业承诺可信进行交易的价格之差上下
①本文为国家自然科学基金项目（批准号：70772114）的部分研究成果。
浙江财经学院硕士学位论文
II
波动幅度在一定范围内时，核心企业与配套企业之间的这种隐性的默契的承诺和
基于“人情圈”关系的承诺是值得可信的。
2. 市场价格与承诺价格之差波动幅度的期望值、关系资本、交易费用、预期
合作得益等因素均对核心企业与配套企业承诺是否可信产生了重要的影响。尤其
是关系资本的投入，对于核心企业与配套企业之间形成更为可信的承诺具有很强
的维持作用，是核心企业（配套企业）承诺可信的有效信号。
3. 关系资本投入是维持核心企业与配套企业可信承诺的有效机制，能在很大
程度上提高核心企业与配套企业相互的关系能力、增进核心企业与配套企业的长
期合作水平、提高合作绩效、减少交易费用、创造合作价值，进而提高核心企业
与配套企业之间的承诺可信性。
4. 就可信承诺的治理而言，迫切需要从影响核心企业与配套企业承诺可信性
概率的影响因素出发，构建一个包含科层治理、市场治理与关系治理三维（经济
纬度、社会纬度和行政纬度）互补的可信承诺治理机制，以提高产业集群内核心
企业与配套企业之间的承诺可信性概率。
本文的创新之处在于：
1.对承诺问题仅限于新政治经济学视角研究的范畴有所拓展，初步将承诺问
题纳入产业集群企业层面进行探讨，从核心企业与配套企业的视角对企业之间合
作过程中以非正式契约形式出现的隐性承诺或基于企业家“关系”的口头承诺是
否可信的问题进行了研究。
2.突破了现有文献对关系资本定义的狭隘性，将企业间相互信任、企业声誉
以及友谊（社会关系、人情关系）等一系列认同关系均纳入关系资本范畴，对关
系资本概念进行了拓展，使得更符合集群发展到这一阶段的现实环境。
3.从集群内部核心企业与配套企业这一企业层面的视角入手，对这一重新界
定的关系资本投入对核心企业与配套企业承诺可信性的影响从理论上进行精细的
探讨，借助一般化的正态分布概率形式将可信的承诺进行量化，继而运用数值模
拟技术就各影响因素对核心企业与配套企业承诺可信性概率进行了分析，又进一
步从理论上研究了关系资本投入对于核心企业与配套企业之间可信的承诺的维持
机制及其作用机制，突破了现有研究仅仅局限于实证或案例分析进行研究而缺乏
相应理论依据支持的不足。
4.在理论研究与现有关于集群治理文献的基础上，系统地提出了一个包含市
场治理、科层治理与关系治理相协调的三维治理体系，尤其重视关系治理对集群
治理的作用，为我国集群内核心企业与配套企业可信承诺治理提供了有效的思路。
关键词：核心企业；可信承诺；数值模拟；治理
浙江财经学院硕士学位论文
III
ABSTRACT
Commitment problem has been belonging to the category discussed by political
economists. The political economy scholars represented by Acemoglu think that man
with political power in hand cannot make believable commitment to constrain his future
action. But along with blending of the economic subjects, commitment problems seem
to have found their way into the field of industrial cluster emerging between the core
enterprise and supporting enterprise. Due to the limited rationality and incomplete
information of the enterprise actors in industrial clusters, the enterprises always fail to
achieve complete contracts, then coming along with the commitment problem. In order
to cooperate smoothly, there are many recessive tacit promises other than the formal
agreements reached by enterprises. In addition, with the existing situation of cluster
development, the cooperation between enterprises is often behaved as the form of
informal agreement or verbal commitment. But these kinds of recessive tacit
undertaking or commitments based on the "personal relationship" between
entrepreneurs share the common characteristics that they are not confirmed by a third
party, and also do not have the binding force of law. Therefore, it is desirable for us to
think deeply whether these commitments are believable, and under which kind of
circumstances the commitment between the core enterprise and supporting enterprise in
the industrial cluster is worthwhile to believe, and related to this is that what factors will
influence the believable commitment between the core enterprise and supporting
enterprise as well as how the acting mechanism works, thus from which comes the
question that how to manage the believable promises made between the two parties and
to make them even more believable. Probing into these questions has great value to
improve the existing cooperation between the core enterprise and supporting enterprise
in the industrial cluster has important contributions.
In view of this, this paper studying on the existing insufficient literature, from the
perspective of enterprise level of the core enterprise and supporting enterprise in
industrial cluster, theoretically constructs a game model of believable commitment
made by the core enterprise with supporting enterprise. With the application of
mathematical analysis method, the author uses the probability of generally normal
distribution to have the believable commitment between the two quantified, discusses in
浙江财经学院硕士学位论文
IV
which cases the commitment will be implemented and makes a further theoretical
analysis of the influence mechanism that how the believable probability of
commitment between the core enterprise and supporting enterprise is affected by these
factors like relationship capital investing, transaction cost saving, as well as expected
long-term cooperation profiting. Taking a further step by using numerical simulation
technology, the author analyzes the impact that the factors including relationship capital
investment have on the believable probability of commitment made by the core
enterprise with supporting enterprise.
In addition, this paper especially attaches the importance to real situation under
which the relationship capital investment influences the core enterprise's believable
commitment to supporting enterprise. Making a theoretical analysis that how the
relationship investment maintains the believable commitment between the core
enterprise and supporting enterprise, and as well as the role it plays in forming the
mechanism of the believable commitment made by the core enterprise with supporting
enterprise.
In the end, based on the previous theoretical analysis, the paper systematically puts
forward a feasible three-dimensional manageable system to govern the believable
commitment between the core enterprise and supporting enterprise.
Through this paper, we get the following main points:
First, when the discrepancy between the market price and the trade price credibly
promised by the core enterprise with supporting enterprise fluctuates within certain
range, the recessive tacit commitment and promise made on the basis of personal
relationship between the core enterprise and supporting enterprise is believable.
Second, the fluctuation's expectations of the discrepancy between market price and
promised price, relationship capital, and transaction costs, as well as the expected
cooperation benefits are the factors that have great important influence in deciding
whether the commitment made by the two parties is believable. The relationship capital
investment especially plays the strong role of maintaining the more believable
commitment achieved by the core enterprise with supporting enterprise, thus it is an
effective signal to suggest whether the commitment is believable or not.
Third, relationship capital investment is an effective mechanism to maintain the
believable commitment between the core enterprise and supporting enterprise, and can
greatly improve the mutual relationship abilities of the two parties, enhance the
long-term cooperation level, improve cooperation performance, diminish exchange cost,
摘要：
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浙江财经学院硕士学位论文I摘要承诺问题一直以来都是政治经济学者讨论的范畴，以Acemoglu为代表的政治经济学者认为，拥有政治权利的人无法做出可信的承诺约束其未来的行动。但随着经济学科的相互交融，承诺问题似乎已经越来越渗入到产业集群领域内的核心企业与配套企业之间。由于集群内企业行为人的有限理性和信息不完全，企业之间往往难以达成完备的契约，于是承诺问题也就出现了。为了合作的顺利进行，在正式契约之外，企业之间往往还存在许多隐性的默契的承诺；此外，集群发展到现有情况下，企业之间的合作也经常表现为企业家之间非正式的契约或口头承诺形式。然而，无论是这些隐性的默契的承诺，还是企业家之间基于“人情圈”关系的...
作者：李佳
分类：高等教育资料
价格：150积分
属性：59 页
大小：659.15KB
格式：PDF
时间：2024-09-20
