上市公司资产评估增值率波动：大股东侵害还是盈余管理——基于2009-2011年的数据

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浙江财经学院硕士学位论文

摘要

我国资本市场中最令人关注的现象之一就是上市公司层出不穷的“资产重组”

活动。这些重组活动的根源往往在于上市公司的机会主义行为，即大股东侵害和

盈余管理。而资产评估作为我国上市公司资产重组定价的核心环节，其结果势必

受到上市公司重组动机的影响。本文就以资产评估增值率为研究主题，深入考察

了上市公司是否会出于大股东侵害和盈余管理两大动机影响资产评估增值率。

本文首先对国内外有关资产评估增值率的研究文献进行了梳理，发现国外的

研究主要集中于资产评估增值和股价变动之间的关系上，而国内的研究更多关注

资产评估增值率的微观影响因素，较少有文献关注上市公司动机对其的影响。

理论分析中，本文系统化地分析了资产评估产生增值的根本原因及其影响因

素，在此基础之上本文得出了上市公司具有影响资产评估增值率的动机和机会，

并深入分析了上市公司大股东侵害动机和盈余管理动机对资产评估增值率造成的

具体影响。

接下来对相关数据的描述性统计和实证分析是本文的重点。本文根据被评估

资产流进公司还是流出公司划分为上市公司置入资产和置出资产，又根据被评估

资产的交易对象划分为与大股东交易、与一般关联方交易和与非关联方交易，还

根据上市公司是否出现微利、亏损或股票被特别处理的情形划分为有盈余管理动

机的上市公司和无盈余管理动机的上市公司，运用非参数检验中的 Mann-Whitney

U检验方法判断各组数据间有无显著性差异来判断这两大动机是否对资产评估增

值率造成显著影响。结果发现在上市公司置入资产的情形中，置入大股东资产的

评估增值率显著低于置入非大股东资产的评估增值率，具有盈余管理动机的上市

公司的资产评估增值率显著低于无盈余管理动机上市公司的评估增值率；而在置

出资产的情形中，交易对象是大股东的资产评估增值率和交易对象为非大股东的

资产评估增值率无显著差异，具有盈余管理动机的上市公司的资产评估增值率与

无盈余管理动机上市公司的评估增值率并无显著差异。由此本文认为 2009-2011 这

三年从整体上说，上市公司并没有利用资产评估向大股东直接输送利益，但上市

公司会出于防亏、扭亏或保牌等盈余管理动机影响资产评估增值率，且主要方式

为低估置入的资产。为了保证上述结论的可靠性，本文采用了非参数检验的另一

种方法 K-S 检验对结论进行了稳健性检验，检验结果表明文中结论并未发生变化。

最后则是对全文的总结，阐述了全文的基本结论并提出相应政策建议，接着

说明本文局限性以及对未来研究的展望。

浙江财经学院硕士学位论文

本文的主要创新之处在于：（1）从理论分析到实证研究，第一次系统性地考

察了上市公司大股东侵害和盈余管理两大动机对资产评估增值率的影响，并得出

2009-2011 这三年从整体上说，我国上市公司主要出于盈余管理动机来影响资产评

估增值率，且主要方式为低估流进上市公司的资产这一结论。（2）由于上市公司

配股条件的变化，本文提出上市公司的盈余管理动机主要为防亏、扭亏和保牌动

机，因此可根据上市公司是否处于微利、亏损或股票被特别处理的状态来对盈余

管理动机做出判断，这对今后类似的研究有一定借鉴意义。

关键词：资产评估；增值率；大股东侵害；盈余管理

浙江财经学院硕士学位论文

III

ABSTRACT

Listed companies’ asset restructuring activities, which emerge in endlessly, is one

of the most watched phenomenons. These asset restructuring activities are usually

rooted in listed companies’ opportunistic behavior, i.e. large shareholders expropriation

and earnings management. Because asset valuation is the core pricing part of listed

companies’ asset restructuring activities, so its results certainly influence by listed

companies’ motivation. This dissertation will use asset valuation rate to observe and

study whether listed companies could exert an influence on the result of asset valuation

out of large shareholders expropriation motivation or earnings management motivation.

To begin with, this dissertation reviews relevant domestic and foreign references

on asset valuation rate, and finds that foreign references mostly focus on the

relationship between asset valuation rates and changes in stock prices, and domestic

references mostly concern about microcosmic influencing factors of asset valuation

rates.

Then is theoretical analysis, based on the systematic analysis of the root causes of

asset valuation rising in value and its influencing factors, this dissertation concludes that

listed companies has the motive and opportunity to affect the asset valuation rates, and

analyses the specific impact of the large shareholders expropriation motivation and

earnings management motivation on asset valuation rates.

Descriptive statistics and empirical analysis of relevant data is the focus of this

dissertation. Based on the assets to be valuated will flow into the company or out of the

company, this thesis divided samples into listed companies inject assets and set out

assets. Based to the transaction object of the assets to be valuated, this thesis divided

samples into transact with large shareholders, general related parties and non-related

parties. Based on whether the listed company is meager profit, loss, or designated as a

“special treatment” stock, this thesis also divided samples into listed companies which

have earnings management motivation and listed companies which do not have earnings

management motivation. This thesis uses non-parametric test (Mann-Whitney U test) to

examine whether there are significant differences between two sets of data to determine

whether large shareholders expropriation motivation or earnings management

motivation makes a significant impact on asset valuation rate. The results show that in

浙江财经学院硕士学位论文

the case of listed companies inject assets, the asset valuation rate of inject the large

shareholders’ assets is significantly lower than that inject other parties’ assets, and the

asset valuation rate of listed companies which have earnings management motivation is

significantly lower than that of listed companies which do not have earnings

management motivation. The results also show that in the case of listed companies set

out assets, there are no significant differences between transact with large shareholders

and transact with other parties, and there are no significant differences between listed

companies which have earnings management motivation and listed companies which do

not have earnings management motivation. As a conclusion, this thesis believe that

listed companies did not take advantage of asset valuation to transfer benefits to large

shareholders directly, but listed companies could influence asset valuation rates because

of preventing loss, turning deficits, keeping the honor "Listed Company" or other

earnings management motivations from 2009 to 2011.

Finally, there is a summary of this thesis，which clarifies the basic conclusions，

limitations, and future research prospects.

It has two innovative points: (1) This dissertation has conducted the first systematic

study of the influence on asset valuation rates of listed companies’ large shareholders

expropriation motivation and earnings management motivation. As a conclusion, this

dissertation believes that, in general, listed companies could influence asset valuation

rates because of earnings management motivation rather then large shareholders

expropriation motivation from 2009 to 2011. (2) Due to the changes in the conditions of

the rights issue, this dissertation proposes that listed companies’ earnings management

motivations mainly relate to preventing loss, turning deficits, keeping the honor "Listed

Company". So this dissertation proposes that it could based on whether the listed

company is meager profit, loss, or designated as a "special treatment" stock to

determine whether it has earnings management motivations or not. This method could

be helpful to future relevant research.

Key words: Asset Valuation；Appreciation Rate；Large Shareholders Expropriation；

Earnings Management

浙江财经学院硕士学位论文

第一章绪论 .................................................................................................................. 1

第一节研究背景及选题意义 ................................................................................... 1

第二节研究思路和方法 ........................................................................................................ 2

第三节研究创新点.................................................................................................................. 4

第二章文献综述 .......................................................................................................... 5

第一节国外研究综述 ............................................................................................................. 5

第二节国内研究综述 ............................................................................................................. 6

第三章资产评估增值率的理论分析 .......................................................................... 12

第一节资产评估增值的根本原因 ...................................................................................12

第二节资产评估增值率的影响因素分析 .....................................................................14

第三节上市公司对资产评估增值率的影响 ................................................................19

第四章资产评估增值率的描述性统计与分析 ........................................................ 23

第一节样本选取与数据来源.............................................................................................23

第二节 2009-2011 年上市公司资产评估现状..............................................................24

第三节上市公司动机与资产评估增值率 .....................................................................27

第四节小结 ..............................................................................................................................32

第五章实证检验 ........................................................................................................ 33

第一节研究假设.....................................................................................................................33

第二节研究设计.....................................................................................................................35

第三节实证检验及结果解释.............................................................................................40

第四节稳健性检验................................................................................................................44

第五节小结 ..............................................................................................................................46

第六章结论、局限与展望 .......................................................................................... 48

第一节结论及政策建议 ......................................................................................................48

第二节研究局限及展望 ......................................................................................................50

参考文献 ........................................................................................................................ 52

附录 ................................................................................................................................ 57

致谢 ................................................................................................................................58

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摘要：

浙江财经学院硕士学位论文I摘要我国资本市场中最令人关注的现象之一就是上市公司层出不穷的“资产重组”活动。这些重组活动的根源往往在于上市公司的机会主义行为，即大股东侵害和盈余管理。而资产评估作为我国上市公司资产重组定价的核心环节，其结果势必受到上市公司重组动机的影响。本文就以资产评估增值率为研究主题，深入考察了上市公司是否会出于大股东侵害和盈余管理两大动机影响资产评估增值率。本文首先对国内外有关资产评估增值率的研究文献进行了梳理，发现国外的研究主要集中于资产评估增值和股价变动之间的关系上，而国内的研究更多关注资产评估增值率的微观影响因素，较少有文献关注上市公司动机对其的影响。理论分析中，本文系统...

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