罗尔斯正义理论中的稳定性问题研究

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浙江财经学院硕士学位论文
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摘 要
相对于政治哲学中对稳定性问题的突出强调,稳定性问题在道德哲学上一直
很少受到人们的重视。罗尔斯力图打破这种状态,提出了基于正当理由的稳定性,
指出一种正义观不仅须应用于社会以促成社会稳定的实现与持续,而且正义观本
身应能自我支持。也就是说,稳定性问题包含了道德稳定性问题与社会稳定性问
题两个维度。
罗尔斯关于道德稳定性的论证旨在说明在两个正义原则规导下的良序社会中
成长起来的人们能够形成一种按照正义原则行动的强烈、有效的欲望——正义感。
关于这一论证,有两个问题需要说明:一是生活在良序社会中的人们如何形成正
义感?二是人们为何给予正义如此突出的地位以使个人的善服从于正义。
针对第一问题,罗尔斯在经验主义的社会学习理论和理性主义的道德学习论
两种传统的道德学习理论的基础上,发展出了关于正义感形成过程的道德心理学,
认为人的道德情感的发生与发展分为权威的道德、社团的道德和原则的道德三个
阶段。人类道德情感的发展过程也就是人类正义感的形成过程,随着道德情感的
发展从“权威的道德”经由“社团的道德”进入“原则的道德”阶段,正义感也
就形成了。作为一种道德情操,正义感的形成与发展对于实现及维护正义观念的
稳定性起着关键性作用。
针对第二个问题,罗尔斯首先对个人的善进行了定义:一个人的善就是一项
理性的生活计划的成功实施。但这些计划或善的观念使人们抱有不同的目的和承
担不同的责任,从而造成了利用自然资源和社会资源方面的冲突。善观念的不确
定性、多样性及其存在的冲突,与正义原则的规范性形成鲜明的对比。正义原则
的终极性条件使得正义必须优先于善。这一优先性有公共性条件、亚里士多德主
义原则、人性假设三个论据作为其根据。
首先,由于罗尔斯理论的契约论性质,正义原则是公共的:它们描述了一个
秩序良好的社会的成员们分享的公认道德信念的特征。由于社会成员都被假定为
具有一种有效的正义感,这使孤独问题和确信问题两种不稳定性倾向得到抑制,
从而使得搭便车等利己主义行为在良序社会会显得得不偿失。
其次,根据亚里士多德主义原则,人类倾向于做复杂的、创造性的、具有微
妙分辨力的活动,个人只有在其生活计划中将此原则考虑在内才是理性的。而运
用正义感的能力——包括了理解、应用和践行正义原则的能力——本身属于人类
更高层次的能力,这一能力包含有复杂的提升与微妙的精致,因而将正义感纳入
浙江财经学院硕士学位论文
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个人的生活计划中,或者说将正义感视为个人善的一部分,对于个人来说是理性
的。
最后,由于人是拥有正义感的能力和善观念的能力两种道德能力的自由、平
等的理性存在者,依据自身选择的原则来行动的欲望正是作为自由的道德人的本
性的欲望的体现,因此正义感本身就是善的一部分。
如果正义原则的道德稳定性问题旨在对正义原则进行道德证成,那么社会稳
定性问题则须关涉现实,考察一个由共同道德证成所支持的历久弥新的公共正义
标准是否能够指导着社会基本结构以有秩序的方式不断改进,从而实现社会秩序
的持久稳定。面对立宪民主社会的合理多元论的普遍事实,罗尔斯对正义原则做
出了合理的调整,将其限制在了政治的层面,换言之,在立宪民主社会中,公平
的正义是以政治的正义观念的身份出现的。只有在这个层面,各种合乎理性的完
备性学说才能够达成重叠共识;而这一过程需要充分正当的理性证明,即找到一
种各方共同认可的公共理性。
“重叠共识”是罗尔斯实现其政治自由主义的支柱性理念。合理多元论持久
存在的普遍事实使得重叠共识的达成成为必要;而合理的完备性宗教学说、完备
性自由主义道德学说以及多元论的观点对政治的正义观念的支持,以及从宪法共
识到重叠共识的必然发展使得重叠共识的达成成为可能。通过这一理念的阐释,
罗尔斯找到了合理解决立宪民主社会中文化价值的合理多元化与社会秩序的稳定
统一之间的矛盾的途径。
如果说“重叠共识”的理念是政治正义这一核心理念的构成性条件,那么,
公共理性的理念则是政治正义的社会普遍基础。正是通过公共理性的运用,完成
了对政治正义观念的运用的正当性证明,或者说是完成了对正义社会合法性的辩
护。
但在任何形式的政权中,完全的正义不可能实现,总是存在着不正义的现象,
这时就需要公民正义感的发挥。作为诉诸正义感来发挥作用的公民不服从,从反
面的角度证实了立宪民主社会也能够在动态稳定中实现长存。
关键词:正义理论;道德稳定性;社会稳定性
浙江财经学院硕士学位论文
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ABSTRACT
As the term is generally used in discourse about politics, stability plays an
important role in political philosophy rather than moral philosophy. In order to span this
flaw, Rawls emphasizes the stability for the right reasons. According to Rawls, when
you talk about the concept of justice, you are not merely to come up with a theory of
justice; you also have to point out how the theory that you are establishing can generate
its own support, why the society based on the theory will continue to endure indefinitely.
In other words, stability argument contains moral stability and social stability.
Rawls’ moral stability argument aims to show that citizens, growing up in a just
and well-ordered sociey, can be motivated to have a normally effective desire that act as
principles of justice. There are two problems to deal with here. First, given natural
human propensities, how do people come to care about justice to begin with? And
second, why should they care about it sufficiently so that they have reason to
subordinate pursuit of their ends to requirements of justice?
As to the first problem, appealing to his own psychological laws of development
psychology, Rawls maintains that children growing up in a society that was
well-ordered according to two principles of justice would come to have a sense of
justice that incorporated them.
As to the second problem, Rawls formally defines a person’s good as the
successful implementation of a rational plan. But owing to the multiple aims and
commitments that people care about, there exits conflicts among people in using natural
resources and social resources. Principles of justice, by contrast, as a consquence of the
condition of finality, are regulative, the desire to act upon them is satisfied only to the
extent that it is likewise regulative with respect to other desires. But what warrants
making the capacity for justice supremely regulative of all people’s pursuits?
Conjoining the publicity, the Aristotelian principle and humanistic hypothesis, we can
identify the fundamental arguments for this question.
Firstly, publicity plays an indispensable part in the theory of justice as fairness.
Fairness itself denotes that mutual acknowledgement of principles which forms the real
important of the language of social contract Rawls has used to articulate his conception
of justice. Stability obtains when the public recognition of principles’ realization by the
social system tends to bring about the corresponding sense of justice.
Secondly, the Aristotelian principle says basically that we desire to exercise our
higher capacities and want to engage in complex and demanding activities, which
浙江财经学院硕士学位论文
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calling on a larger repertoire of more intricate and subtle discrimination, for their own
sake so long as they are within our reach. Rawls’ main contention is that, assuming the
Aristotelian principle characterizes human naturethen a plan of life is rational for a
person only if it takes this principle into account. The capacity for a sense of justice,
which involves an ability to understand, apply, and act on and from requirements of
justice, is among our higher capacities. This capacity admits of complex development
and refinement. Consequently, it’s rational for each to develop it as part of our plan of
life.
Finally, Rawls adopts Kant’s position, that persons are, by their nature, free, equal
and rational beings. The nature of free, equal and rational beings is their moral
personality which is in effect the capacities including a capacity for a sense of justice as
well as a capacity for a conception of the good. So, the desire to act in ways that express
one’s nature as a free, equal and rational being is practically speaking the same desire as
the desire to act upon principles of justice acceptable from an original position of
equality.
Rawls’ social stability is raised to test the feasibility of a just and well-ordered
society of justice as fairness. Facing the fact of reasonable pluralism, it is unrealistic to
expect that citizens in a well-ordered society will all agree on the intrinic good of justice.
As a result, Rawls transforms the justice as fairness which is a part of a comprehensive
moral doctrine into a political conception. Only in this way, can the various kinds of
reasonable comprehensive doctrines have a consensus. This accounts for Rawls’
development of the idea of overlapping consensus and public reason central to political
liberalism.
While Rawls present the idea of overlapping consensus entirely as a response to
the question of how a modern constitutional democratic society could be stable given
the fact of reasonable pluralism. The idea of public reason, as a norm of political
justification, answers the question of how Rawls derives a norm of political conduct
from a clam about how democratic institutions could, ideally, be stable in the right way.
There exists injustice inevitably in any kind of regime. As a special case of the
constitutional democratic society, the Civil Disobedience plays a great role in
maintaining the stability of the constitutional democratic society. Through the Civil
Disobedience, Rawls confirms that the constitutional democratic society based on the
justice as fairness which acts as a political conception of justice can endure indefinitely.
Keywords: the theory of justice; moral stability; social stability
浙江财经学院硕士学位论文
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目 录
绪论···································································································································1
上篇 罗尔斯正义原则的理据:道德稳定性问题·······················································13
第一章 正义稳定性的道德心理基础·······································································15
第一节 稳定性论证的背景条件及稳定性的意义···············································15
第二节 人类道德情感的发生与发展···································································17
第三节 正义感的形成及其道德意义···································································19
第二章 正义与善的契合论证···················································································25
第一节 个人的善:理性的善···············································································25
第二节 正义对善的优先·······················································································29
第三节 正义与善的契合·······················································································31
第三章 罗尔斯正义理论的人性假设·······································································35
第一节 人是自由平等的理性存在者——一种康德式的人性观·······················35
第二节 康德式人性观的本质···············································································37
下篇 罗尔斯正义原则的运用:社会稳定性问题·······················································41
第四章 重叠共识与公共理性:正义社会的实现···················································45
第一节 社会稳定实现的两种模式·······································································45
第二节 社会内在稳定的实现途径:重叠共识···················································47
第三节 正义社会的合法性辩护:公共理性·······················································52
第五章 公民不服从在正义社会中的作用·······························································57
第一节 公民不服从的定义及其正当性的证明···················································58
第二节 公民不服从的作用···················································································60
结语·································································································································63
参考文献·························································································································65
附录·································································································································68
致谢·································································································································69
浙江财经学院硕士学位论文
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绪 论
第一节 研究综述与问题的提出
一、国内外研究罗尔斯正义理论中的稳定性问题的现状
罗尔斯的《正义论》于 1971 年一经问世(1988 年 3 月中译版《正义论》在国
内出版),便产生了划时代的思想效应,对罗尔斯正义理论的研究更是形成了“罗
尔斯产业”然而在浩如烟海的研究罗尔斯的文献中,对罗尔斯正义理论的稳定性
问题的关注却相对较少,这与罗尔斯的初衷似乎背道而驰。罗尔斯将正义理论的
稳定性的证成看作是其理论体系不可或缺的一部分,在《正义论》中,罗尔斯用
三分之一的篇幅就正义原则的稳定性进行了论证,而在代表其理论转向的《政治
自由主义》中,罗尔斯则直接指出:“对于政治哲学来说,稳定性问题至关重要,
而一种不一致性必定要求基本性的调整。到底稳定性问题指称什么?为何对于
罗尔斯来说如此重要的问题却引起了外界如此不相称的响应?在有关的文献中,
学者们又是围绕稳定性的哪几个点展开的?带着这些疑问,本综述将从罗尔斯正
义理论的稳定性问题的维度、稳定性问题在罗尔斯正义理论中的重要性、实现稳
定性的途径以及罗尔斯解决稳定性问题的过程中理论的变化等几个方面展开,以
期对罗尔斯正义理论的稳定性问题的研究现状有一个整体的把握。
(一)对罗尔斯正义理论中的稳定性问题的维度的分析
罗尔斯本人并未对稳定性问题进行维度的划分,部分学者认为罗尔斯理论中
隐含着稳定性问题维度的区分。如克洛斯科(George Klosko)认为,罗尔斯把稳
定性问题划分为“道德稳定性”与“政治稳定性”“道德稳定性”是实现“政治
稳定性”的前提。与克洛斯科类似,香港中文大学学者周保松也将罗尔斯正义理
论中的稳定性问题区分为两个维度:“道德稳定性”与“社会稳定性”不同的是,
周保松认为“道德稳定性”独立于“社会稳定性”国内学者丛占修则认为罗尔斯
正义理论中的稳定性问题包括了“正义观念的稳定性”与“正义制度的稳定性”
两个维度,并指出二者相互联系但又很难做出严格的区分,因此在其对罗尔斯的
稳定性论证进行探析的过程中两个维度的稳定性是混在一起的。姚大志与丛占修
〔美〕约翰·罗尔斯.政治自由主义(增订版)[M].万俊人,译.南京:译林出版社,2011:XVII.
Klosko, G. (1994). Rawls's Argument from Political Stability. Columbia Law Review, 94(6), 1882-1897.
丛占修.罗尔斯的稳定性论证探析[J].天津社会科学,2011,(2):21-25.
摘要:

浙江财经学院硕士学位论文5摘要相对于政治哲学中对稳定性问题的突出强调,稳定性问题在道德哲学上一直很少受到人们的重视。罗尔斯力图打破这种状态,提出了基于正当理由的稳定性,指出一种正义观不仅须应用于社会以促成社会稳定的实现与持续,而且正义观本身应能自我支持。也就是说,稳定性问题包含了道德稳定性问题与社会稳定性问题两个维度。罗尔斯关于道德稳定性的论证旨在说明在两个正义原则规导下的良序社会中成长起来的人们能够形成一种按照正义原则行动的强烈、有效的欲望——正义感。关于这一论证,有两个问题需要说明:一是生活在良序社会中的人们如何形成正义感?二是人们为何给予正义如此突出的地位以使个人的善服从于正义。针对第一...

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