国有上市公司高管薪酬业绩敏感性研究——基于管理层权力的视角

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浙江财经学院硕士学位论文

摘要

基于业绩的薪酬契约被认为是实现经理人目标和股东目标兼容的主要机制之

一。于是，薪酬业绩敏感性成为高管激励研究的核心问题。越来越多的实证证据

表明国有上市公司高管薪酬与绩效显著正相关，并且薪酬业绩敏感性在逐渐增强。

这似乎说明了国有企业已经逐步建立起了以业绩为基础的薪酬制度，高管薪酬在

一定程度上具有了“最优契约论”的特征。然而，现实中的薪酬乱象引起了社会

公众对于国有企业高管薪酬的强烈质疑和持续关注。国企高管运用权力自定薪酬

成为解释薪酬问题的两种矛盾表现的普遍声音。薪酬契约也许并不能解决代理问

题，其本身就是代理问题的另一种表现形式，这就是薪酬制定的“管理层权力论”。

自20 世纪 80 年代初以来，国有企业从“放权让利”改革开始，之后经历了

“两权分离”改革、建立与完善“现代企业制度”改革等不同阶段，在这个过程

中，放权让利的基本改革取向使得国有企业管理层权力得到不断的形成和提升。

因此，国有上市公司管理层权力一方面是国有企业制度转型的产物；另一方面，

公司治理的弱化包括股权结构有待优化、董事会功能弱化、监事会监督乏力等内

部制衡机制的缺陷和信息披露制度亟需完善、经理人市场较为落后、控制权市场

不够活跃等外部约束机制的缺乏致使内部人控制问题在国有上市公司凸显。由此，

管理层权力能够凌驾于公司治理机制之上，国有上市公司高管在自身薪酬的获取

方面也拥有了超越控股股东和董事会的影响力。

薪酬激励通过与业绩相挂钩授予部分剩余索取权以实现管理者利益与股东利

益的趋同。但是，享受剩余同时也意味着必须承担风险。业绩型薪酬的风险暴露

属性表现为剩余索取权配置和薪酬契约刚性。管理层权力的膨胀使得风险厌恶的

管理者能够进行权力寻租规避业绩型薪酬产生的风险暴露。首先，管理层运用其

权力降低薪酬业绩敏感性，从而规避企业剩余风险，弱化薪酬的不确定性。其次，

管理层运用其权力选择性地更改薪酬条款，使业绩上升时和业绩下降时的薪酬业

绩敏感性呈现明显的非对称性，从而选择性地剔除风险，侵蚀薪酬契约的刚性。

本文选取 2008—2011 年A股国有上市公司为样本，实证检验了国有上市公司

高管权力对薪酬业绩敏感性的影响。结果显示：国有上市公司高管权力越大，薪

酬业绩敏感性越低；其在业绩上升时和业绩下降时的薪酬业绩敏感性具有更明显

的非对称性，即提高业绩上升时的薪酬业绩敏感性，降低业绩下降时的薪酬业绩

敏感性。国有上市公司中高管薪酬业绩敏感性的建立增强在一定程度上说明了薪

酬契约的有效性，但管理层权力的膨胀使得薪酬契约中也包含了权力寻租的部分。

浙江财经学院硕士学位论文

基于研究的主要结论，首先，本文提出通过构建以 EVA 为核心的业绩评价指

标集、关注会计盈余质量以及加强短板指标考核来完善国有上市公司高管业绩考

核体系。其次，健全国有上市公司管理层权力约束制衡机制需要从优化内部治理

结构和完善外部治理机制上双管齐下。具体包括：构建多元化的股权结构，提高

机构投资者持股比例；强化董事会的公司治理核心作用；导入独立监事制度、加

强监事会建设；健全高管薪酬披露制度；积极培育经理人市场和控制权市场。

本文的主要贡献如下：

第一、研究角度的创新。已有文献主要从薪酬水平、薪酬结构、薪酬差距等

角度出发来研究管理层能够利用权力影响自身薪酬，本文则以当前业绩型薪酬下

的核心维度——薪酬业绩敏感性为切入点来寻找管理层权力在薪酬契约中的寻租

证据。在业绩型薪酬下，管理层权力寻租表现为规避薪酬与业绩挂钩产生的风险

暴露，并能够最终体现在薪酬业绩敏感性中。具体地，本文通过研究高管薪酬业

绩敏感性的大小和薪酬在业绩上升和下降时是否存在更明显的非对称性来体现管

理层权力的寻租属性。

第二、实证变量的创新。在参考 Finkelstein（1992）提出的权力模型基础上，

利用两职合一、高管任期、高管持股和社会资本四个指标分别衡量管理层结构权

力、专家权力、所有权权力和声誉权力，并结合国有上市公司管理层权力的特殊

制度背景，国有企业放权让利的市场化改革形成了金字塔股权结构，由此以金字

塔控制链条深度作为国有上市公司管理层权力的制度化特征。本文将这 5个从不

同侧面刻画国有上市公司管理层权力特征的变量组合构建出综合权力维度，全面

测度了国有上市公司管理层权力的构成情况，从而弥补了已有研究对管理层权力

的衡量不够全面的不足。

关键词：管理层权力；薪酬业绩敏感性；国有上市公司；权力寻租

浙江财经学院硕士学位论文

III

ABSTRACT

The performance-based compensation contract is deemed to one of the main

mechanisms to realize the compatibility of shareholders’ and managers’ targets.

Therefore, compensation performance sensitivity has become the core issue of the

research on top management incentive. An increasing number of empirical evidence

indicates that top management compensation is significantly positively related with

performance, and the compensation performance sensitivity is gradually higher. It seems

that SOEs have gradually established the performance-based compensation system and

the top management compensation have provided the feature of “optimal contract

perspective” to some extent. However, the compensation chaos of listed SOEs has led to

strongly public question and continuous public attention. The compensation that is set

by the managers of SOEs themselves provides a popular explanation. Compensation

contract which represent another form of the problem can’t solve the agency problems.

That is “managerial power perspective” for top management compensation decision.

Since the 1980s, the basic reform direction of decentralization and interest

concessions have made the managerial power constantly rising in the process of SOEs’

reforms of “putting authority to let benefit”, ”two rights separation” and “building

modern enterprise system”. As a result, the managerial power of Listed SOEs is the

product of institutional transformation on the one hand. On the other hand, the

weakening of corporate governance including the internal balance mechanism defect

(the defective equity structure, the weak function of the board of directors, the

invalidation of the board of supervisors) and external restraint mechanism shortcoming

(the inactive takeover market, the lagging manager market, the less perfect disclosure

system)has led to serious "insider control" issue in Listed SOEs. Managerial power thus

can overwhelm the corporate governance. And top managers possess the influence over

controlling shareholders and board of directors on the obtaining of their own

compensation.

Compensation incentive is expected to realize the convergence of interest between

shareholders and managers through linking with performance. However, Sharing in

residual also means risk taking. The risk exposure attribute of performance

compensation is reflected in residual claimant right and contract rigidity. The excessive

managerial power makes it possible to seek rents to avoid the compensation risk for risk

aversion managers. First, the management exercises power decrease compensation

浙江财经学院硕士学位论文

performance sensitivity, consequently to avoid the residual risk and weaken the

compensation uncertainty. Second, the management exercises power to selectively alter

contract terms which present the apparent asymmetry of compensation performance

increasing and decreasing sensitivity, thus to get rid of compensation risk and erode

contract rigidity.

By selecting the samples of listed SOEs from 2008 to 2011, this article empirically

tests the influence of top management power on compensation performance sensitivity. I

find that: the greater power of top managers bring out the lower compensation

performance sensitivity and the higher asymmetry of compensation performance while

increasing and decreasing sensitivity. The increasing of sensitivity indicates the

effectiveness of compensation contract to a certain extent, which also contains some

part of rent-seeking because of the excessive managerial power.

In conclusion, this article proposes to improve the top managers’ performance

evaluation system of listed SOEs by setting up a EVA centered performance evaluation

index system、paying much attention to the earning equality and strengthening the

evaluation of constraint indexes. In addition, consummating the inhibiting and

balancing mechanism of SOEs’ managerial power must optimize internal governance

structure along with external governance mechanism, including building a diversified

ownership structure, strengthening the core governance function of the board of

directors and the construction of the board of supervisors, improving the top managers’

compensation disclosure system、manager market and takeover market.

The main contribution of the article is as follows:

1.Perspective innovation. Existing papers study the influence of managerial power

on top managers’ own compensation mainly from the perspectives of compensation

amount, compensation structure, compensation gap and so on. This article takes the core

dimension the current performance-based compensation -compensation performance

sensitivity as the breakthrough point to look for power management the rent-seeking

evidence of managerial power in compensation contact. Rent-seeking is reflected as

avoiding the risk exposure by linking compensation with performance, and is shown in

compensation performance sensitivity. Concretely, the article discusses compensation

performance sensitivity and the asymmetry of compensation performance while

increasing and decreasing sensitivity.

2.Variable innovation. Referring to the power model put forward by

Finkelstein(1992),the article uses general manager duality, tenure, share holding and

浙江财经学院硕士学位论文

social capital to respectively measure structure power, expert power, ownership power

and reputation power and combining with the reform of decentralization and interest

concessions, which forms the pyramid shareholding structure, add pyramid chain depth

as the institutional feature of listed SOEs. The paper combines the five variables that

describe managerial power of listed SEOs from different aspects as a comprehensive

power index, the cement power structure, thus making up for the one-sided shortage of

existing research on the power measurement.

Key words: Managerial Power; Compensation Performance Sensitivity; Listed

State-owned Enterprises; Rent-seeking of Power

浙江财经学院硕士学位论文

第一章绪论 .................................................................................................................... 1

第一节研究背景与意义 ....................................................................................... 1

第二节研究内容、研究方法及创新点 ............................................................... 3

第三节相关概念界定 ........................................................................................... 5

第二章理论基础与文献综述 ........................................................................................ 7

第一节理论基础 ................................................................................................... 7

第二节国内外文献综述 ......................................................................................11

第三章管理层权力的制度背景及其寻租方式分析 .................................................. 17

第一节国有上市公司管理层权力的制度背景分析 ......................................... 17

第二节管理层权力在业绩型薪酬中的寻租方式及表现 ................................. 22

第四章 A股国有上市公司管理层权力与薪酬业绩敏感性的实证研究 ................. 29

第一节实证设计 ................................................................................................. 29

第二节描述性统计和数据回归 ......................................................................... 34

第五章研究结论、政策建议和展望 ........................................................................ 44

第一节研究的主要结论 ..................................................................................... 44

第二节完善高管业绩考核体系和管理层权力约束制衡机制的对策建议 ..... 45

第三节研究的局限性和展望 ............................................................................. 52

参考文献 ........................................................................................................................ 54

附录................................................................................................................................ 59

致谢……........................................................................................................................ 60

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摘要：

浙江财经学院硕士学位论文I摘要基于业绩的薪酬契约被认为是实现经理人目标和股东目标兼容的主要机制之一。于是，薪酬业绩敏感性成为高管激励研究的核心问题。越来越多的实证证据表明国有上市公司高管薪酬与绩效显著正相关，并且薪酬业绩敏感性在逐渐增强。这似乎说明了国有企业已经逐步建立起了以业绩为基础的薪酬制度，高管薪酬在一定程度上具有了“最优契约论”的特征。然而，现实中的薪酬乱象引起了社会公众对于国有企业高管薪酬的强烈质疑和持续关注。国企高管运用权力自定薪酬成为解释薪酬问题的两种矛盾表现的普遍声音。薪酬契约也许并不能解决代理问题，其本身就是代理问题的另一种表现形式，这就是薪酬制定的“管理层权力论”。自20世...

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